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Plaintiff/Appellee Utah Transit Authority ("UTA") files this brief in response to
the brief filed by Defendant/Appellant Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union (the
"Union").
STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102 (LexisNexis
2009) and 78B-11-129 (LexisNexis 2008), in that the Union has filed a notice of appeal
of a district court order denying a motion to compel arbitration within the time specified
in Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the district court err in denying the Union's Motion to Compel

Arbitration and in granting UTA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the ground
that the underlying dispute in this case - whether UTA violated Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2a813(2) by failing to bargain with the Union in good faith - was subject to resolution in
Utah's courts of general jurisdiction and not by arbitration?
Standard of Review: Correctness. Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1996)
("A trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration presents a question of law which
we review for correctness.").
2.

Should the underlying case be dismissed as moot because a judgment on

the merits would no longer provide meaningful relief to the prevailing party?
Standard of Review: This is an issue to be decided by this Court in the first
instance. Accordingly, there is no applicable standard of review.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

I
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below.

i

This is an appeal from a district court order denying a motion to compel arbitration
filed by Defendant Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union (the "Union") and
granting a motion for partial summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Utah Transit Authority
("UTA"). UTA's motion for partial summary judgment sought a determination by the
district court that the underlying dispute between the parties was not subject to
arbitration.
UTA filed its complaint in the district court on April 23, 2010. The complaint

(

sought a declaratory judgment that (1) under UTA's "13(c) Arrangement" the issue of
impasse was subject to resolution in the district court and not by arbitration; and (2) that
i

UTA and the Union were at impasse in their collective bargaining on December 21, 2009,
when UTA unilaterally modified the terms and conditions of employment for UTA
employees in the bargaining unit. The Union responded only by filing a motion to
compel arbitration; it never answered UTA's complaint. Shortly after the Union filed its
motion to compel arbitration, UTA filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking
a determination that the question of whether UTA violated Utah law in unilaterally
implementing changed terms and conditions of employment on December 21, 2009 was
an issue for decision by the district court, not by an arbitrator.
These competing motions were fully briefed and then argued before the district
court on July 9, 2010. The district court issued its "Ruling on Defendant's Motion to
Compel Arbitration and Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" on
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
7 may contain errors.

*

September 7, 2010. On September 16, 2010, the Union filed a "Motion to Amend Ruling
on Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment." The parties subsequently stipulated to an "Amended Ruling on
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment," which the district court issued on November 10, 2010. On November 23,
2010, the Union filed its Notice of Appeal.
2.

Statement of Relevant Facts.

UTA is a Utah public transit district with operations in several Utah counties along
the Wasatch Front and headquarters in Salt Lake County. Record at 95, f 2. The Union
is an unincorporated association with its principal office in Salt Lake County. Record at
96,13.
UTA filed this case in the district court seeking a declaratory judgment that (1) the
issue of whether the parties had reached an "impasse" in bargaining was to be decided by
a court, not an arbitrator; and (2) UTA had bargained in good faith to impasse and was
therefore at liberty to unilaterally implement changes to the terms and conditions of
employment consistent with its bargaining proposals. Record at 5. The Union never
filed an Answer to UTA's Complaint. The Union has sought no affirmative relief It has
only sought an order that the parties must arbitrate the issues UTA presented to the
district court in its Complaint. Record at 62-64.
At the time the Complaint was filed, the then-most recent collective bargaining
agreement between UTA and the Union had expired on December 21, 2009 (at the
conclusion of a short extension agreed by the parties from December 10), without the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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parties having agreed on a replacement CBA. Record at 96, ^ 5. As a result, there was
no collective bargaining agreement in effect at the time that this case was initiated in the
district court, and negotiations over a replacement CBA had been discontinued. Record
at 96, ^f 7. Although negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful, UTA and the Union had
begun negotiating over a replacement CBA in August 2009, and met approximately 14
times from August through December. UTA contended that it had fulfilled its duty to
negotiate in good faith to the point of impasse, and that the parties had in fact reached an
impasse in bargaining. Record at 96, % 6. Based on its declaration of impasse, and after
the expiration of the CBA on December 21, 2009, UTA implemented changes to the
employees' terms and conditions of employment and informed the Union of its actions.
Record at 96, f 8.
In addition to collective bargaining agreements that UTA and the Union have
entered into over the years, UTA and the Union are also subject to an "arrangement"
pursuant to Section 13(c) ("13(c) Arrangement") of the Urban Mass Transportation Act
of 1964 (49 U.S.C. § 5333(b)(2005)), which requires in general that public transit
agencies that receive federal funds make "protective arrangements" for the benefit of
employees. Record at 97, Tf 10.
Pursuant to the 13(c) Arrangement, either UTA or the Union has the option of
invoking "fact-finding" proceedings in the event that the parties are not able to reach
agreement after 60 days of bargaining over a collective bargaining agreement. In factfinding, the parties present their positions concerning the subjects of bargaining to a

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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neutral fact-finder, who then makes non-binding recommendations for resolving the
dispute. Record at 97, ^J12.
The 13(c) Arrangement includes the following statement, which is found in the
description of the fact-finding procedures: "The terms and conditions of any expiring
collective bargaining agreement between the parties shall remain in place following
expiration of such agreement, unless otherwise mutually agreed in writing by the parties,
until the conclusion of the fact-finding proceedings." Record at 91 (§ 9(g) of the 13(c)
Arrangement).
As of the time of filing the Complaint below, neither UTA nor the Union had
invoked fact-finding. UTA asserted the position that the limitation on unilateral action
stated in § 9(g) had no effect unless and until fact-finding was invoked by either party.
Arbitration Board's Opinion and Award, Exhibit A to Affidavit of Rodney Dunn
("Arbitration Award"), at 16.1
The 13(c) Arrangement provides for arbitration, at the election of either party, of
disputes between the parties regarding only the "application, interpretation, or
enforcement" of the 13(c) Arrangement. Record at 97, ^f 15. Pursuant to this provision,
the parties agreed to arbitrate the issue of whether the 13(c) Arrangement, specifically
11 (9)(g) of the 13(c) Arrangement, prohibited UTA from modifying the terms and
conditions of employment on December 21, 2009. Record at 97, ^f 16. However,
although the Union proposed that the parties also arbitrate the issue of whether UTA
bargained in good faith to impasse, UTA declined on the ground that those issues were
1

The Dunn Affidavit, including relevant excerptsfromthe Arbitration Award, is attached hereto as Addendum A.

10

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

not within the scope of the arbitration clause in the 13(c) Arrangement. Record at 98,

1117.
On December 15, 2010, the neutral arbitrator in the arbitration between UTA and
Local 382 rendered his decision. Arbitration Award at 36. The arbitrator ruled that
1 (9)(g) of the 13(c) Arrangement precluded UTA from unilaterally implementing any
change to the terms and conditions of the expiring collective bargaining agreement until
it had first completed the fact-finding proceedings set forth in the 13(c) Arrangement.
Award at 35. In addition, the arbitrator ruled that UTA was required to reinstate the
terms and conditions of the expiring collective bargaining agreement. Arbitration Award
at 35.
Subsequent to the arbitrator's decision, the parties entered into negotiations which
resulted in a successor collective bargaining agreement effective April 1, 2011 and
continuing to December 10, 2011. Dunn Affidavit, Addendum A, at 1fl[ 5-6.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The question of whether UTA negotiated in good faith to impasse must be decided
by Utah's courts of general jurisdiction, not by an out-of-state arbitrator. As declared by the
Supreme Court of the United States, the labor protective provisions of the Urban Mass
Transportation Act of 1964 require that public transit workers are accorded collective
bargaining rights, but under state laws, as enforced in state courts. Thus, although UTA's
13(c) Arrangement includes an obligation to collectively bargain with the representatives of
UTA's employees, that obligation has application only if the state has failed to enact laws
that provide collective bargaining rights. Thus, enforcement of Utah state collective
11

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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bargaining laws by state courts takes precedence over enforcement of the 13(c)
Arrangement by arbitration. The 13(c) Arrangement does not provide for arbitration of
statutory disputes, but only violations of the Arrangement itself
The Union's allegations in this case are akin to "unfair labor practices" in the private
sector, and unfair labor practices are not arbitrated, but are litigated before the National
Labor Relations Board, the federal circuit courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court. On the
other hand, labor arbitrators typically do not deal with unfair labor practices, but instead
address alleged violations of specific collective bargaining agreements. For this reason, the
Union is incorrect in arguing that arbitrators have special expertise in resolving unfair labor
practices. They do not have expertise in this area, and state court judges are capable of
resolving such disputes.
In addition, providing for adjudication of this dispute will allow Utah labor law to be
developed by Utah judges issuing public opinions that are subject to appeal, not by nearly
unreviewable arbitration awards issued privately by arbitrators. In fact, because Utah has
relatively few unionized workplaces, the vast majority of arbitrators are based outside Utah,
and it is very unlikely that any disputes between UTA and the Union would ever be
arbitrated before an arbitrator based in Utah. Accordingly, allowing enforcement by
arbitration would frustrate the development of Utah's own labor law in Utah's state courts,
and would effectively cede to arbitrators the ability to declare the fundamental rights of
Utah employees. For these reasons, the Union's motion to compel arbitration was properly
denied by the district court.
Response to Union's Memorandum in Opposition to Suggestion of Mootness.
12
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The underlying dispute in this case - whether UTA bargained in good faith to
impasse - is clearly moot by reason of the arbitrator's resolution of the dispute regarding the
meaning of the status quo provision in the 13(c) Arrangement and the negotiation of a new
collective bargaining agreement in response. There is no further remedy to be provided
beyond the arbitrator's order that UTA restore the status quo ante. Nor is the underlying
dispute within the scope of the public interest exception. Although the dispute is a matter of
public concern, it is unlikely to arise again because of the requirement that UTA engage in
fact-finding before making unilateral changes, regardless whether UTA has bargained in
good faith to impasse. In addition, if it does recur, there is no reason to expect that it would
evade review.
Notwithstanding that the underlying dispute is moot, UTA agrees that the specific
question on appeal, that is, whether alleged violations of the duty to bargain in good faith
are subject to resolution in the courts or by an arbitrator, is not moot. That particular issue is
a matter of public concern, is likely to recur, and could evade review.
ARGUMENT
L

THE QUESTION WHETHER UTA NEGOTIATED IN GOOD FAITH TO
THE POINT OF IMPASSE MUST BE DECIDED BY UTAH'S COURTS OF
GENERAL JURISDICTION.
The question of whether UTA complied with its duty under Utah law to negotiate in

good faith with the Union to the point of impasse must be decided by Utah's courts of
general jurisdiction, and not by a labor arbitrator, because although the Urban Mass
Transportation Act of 1964 ("UMTA") requires that federally-funded local transit districts
provide for the continuation of collective bargaining rights for their employees, Congress
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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intended that those collective bargaining rights be provided through state laws, and enforced
by state courts. This point was declared by the Supreme Court and cannot be avoided. See
Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 27-28
(1982) (stating that federal law required the continuation of collective bargaining rights for
public transit employees, but that "state courts would retain jurisdiction to determine the
application of state [labor] policy to local government transit labor relations").
In compliance with the UMTA, the Utah State Legislature has enacted a series of
statutes providing collective bargaining rights for transit employees, culminating in the
current version, found at Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2a-813 (LexisNexis 2007). Accordingly,
the underlying issue is whether UTA, in negotiating with the Union, complied with Utah
state law, and that underlying issue is not subject to the dispute resolution procedures set
forth in the 13(c) Arrangement; rather, it must be decided by the state courts, and ultimately
this Court.
The Union attempts to minimize the Jackson Transit ruling by entirely omitting any
reference to the Supreme Court's actual language, and instead reporting only part of the
case, i.e., that "the subject Section 13(c) Arrangement must be enforced in Utah courts and
using primarily Utah law." Union's Brief at 13. As shown below, Jackson Transit requires
more. Not only must the 13(c) Arrangement be interpreted using state law, the labor laws
applied to UTA's actions in this case must in fact be Utah labor laws, and those laws must
be interpreted and applied by Utah courts.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A.

UTA'S LABOR RELATIONS ARE GOVERNED BY UTAH STATE
LAW.

UTA's labor relations are directly governed by the following Utah Code provision:
17B-2a-813. Rights, benefits, and protective conditions for employees
of a public transit district - Strike prohibited - Employees of an
acquired transit system.
(1) The rights, benefits, and other employee protective conditions and
remedies of Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964,
49 U.S.C. Sec. 5333(b), as determined by the Secretary of Labor, apply to a
public transit district's establishment and operation of a public transit
service or system.
(2) (a) Employees of a public transit system established and operated by
a public transit district have the right to:
(i) self-organization;
(ii) form, join, or assist labor organizations; and
(iii) bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing.
(b) Employees of a public transit district and labor organizations
may not join in a strike against the public transit system operated by the
public transit district.
(c) Each public transit district shall:
(i) recognize and bargain exclusively with any labor organization
representing a majority of the district's employees in an appropriate unit
with respect to wages, salaries, hours, working conditions, and welfare,
pension, and retirement provisions; and
(ii) upon reaching agreement with the labor organization, enter into
and execute a written contract incorporating the agreement.
Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2a-813. This code provision was enacted to comply with
Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act ("UMTA"), as specifically stated in
subsection (1). Id. at § 813(1); see Burke v. Utah Transit Authority, 462 F.3d 1253,
1258-59 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that § 813's predecessor was enacted to comply with
Section 13(c)). Section 13(c) requires, as a condition of federal financial assistance for
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public transit districts, that states guarantee to transit employees, among other things, the
continuation of "collective bargaining rights." 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b)(2).
However, although it is federal law that requires states to provide basic collective
bargaining rights as a condition of federal transit funding, these rights are still to be
provided and enforced under state law. In Jackson Transit, the Supreme Court
considered the question whether a cause of action for breach of a "13(c) arrangement"
was properly asserted in state or federal court. The Court held that such claims were to
be brought in state court, based upon its determination that Congress intended to preserve
state control over the labor relations of public transit districts. Jackson Transit, 457 U.S.
at 27-28 (1982).
The Supreme Court's analysis of this issue is instructive. The Court itemized
repeated references during the Congressional debates that stated the intent of the
UMTA's sponsors that labor relations between a public transit district and its employees
would continue to be governed by state law. For example, the Senate Committee Report
on the proposed law stated "'In regard to the question as to whether these provisions
would supersede State labor laws, the committee concurs in a statement made by the
Secretary of Labor that there could be no superseding of State laws by a provision of this
kind.'" 457 U.S. at 25 (quoting S. Rep. No. 82, 88* Cong., 1st Sess., 29 (1963)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Based on these and other Congressional statements, the Court
declared that "While the statutory language supplies no definitive answer, the legislative
history is conclusive. A consistent theme runs throughout the consideration of § 13(c):

16
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i
Congress intended that labor relations between transit workers and local governments
would be controlled by state law." Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
The Court ultimately concluded with this interpretation of Section 13(c) and the
role of state law:
Thus, Congress made it absolutely clear that it did not intend to create a
body of federal law applicable to labor relations between local
governmental entities and transit workers. Section 13(c) would not
supersede state law, it would leave intact the exclusion of local government
employers from the National Labor Relations Act, and state courts would
retain jurisdiction to determine the application of state policy to local
government transit labor relations. Congress intended that § 13(c) would
be an important tool to protect the collective-bargaining rights of transit
workers, by ensuring that state law preserved their rights before federal aid
could be used to convert private companies into public entities.

<

<l

Jackson Transit, 457 U.S. at 27-28 (1982) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In short,
Congress intended that state law and state courts should govern the collective bargaining
4
rights of public transit workers.
B.

UTAH STATE LAW MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH FEDERAL
LABOR POLICY, BUT IT IS STILL STATE LAW TO BE
ENFORCED BY STATE COURTS.

i

While the Supreme Court in Jackson Transit declared that transit labor relations
were to be governed by state law in compliance with Section 13(c), the Court did not

.

explain the role, if any, to be played by federal law. This question was answered by a
federal appeals court in the case of Amalgamated Transit Union International v.
i
Donovan, 767 F.2d 939, 948-49 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1046 (1986).
The Donovan court held that although collective bargaining rights are to be provided by
state law, they must be consistent with "federal labor policy." Donovan, 767 F.2d at 948-
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i

49. The court then gave the following definition of "collective bargaining/5 which it held
must be provided by state law to be consistent with "federal labor policy": "Then as
now, collective bargaining was universally understood to require, at a minimum, good
faith negotiations, to a point of impasse, if necessary, over wages, hours and other terms
and conditions of employment." 767 F.2d at 949 (emphasis in original). Thus, state
statutes enacted to comply with Section 13(c) must provide for the continuation of
"collective bargaining rights," which include, at a minimum, the duty to bargain in good
faith to impasse, if necessary. Id.
Based on Jackson Transit and Donovan, the roles of the state and federal
governments in labor relations for public transit districts are clear: transit labor relations
are governed by state labor laws and enforced through remedies provided by those laws.
However, those state laws must incorporate the basics of federal labor policy, which
means that they must "require, at a minimum, goodfaith negotiations, to a point of
impasse, if necessary, over wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment."
Accordingly, Utah Code § 17B-2a-813 ("Section 813"), which was enacted to
comply with Section 13(c), and which explicitly provides collective bargaining rights to
employees of public transit districts in Utah, logically must be interpreted to include these
minimum rights as explained by Donovan. Therefore, UTA has a duty - under Utah state
law - to recognize and bargain with the representative of its employees in good faith to
impasse, if necessary.
Given the Supreme Court's express direction in Jackson Transit, it is plain that the
Union's demand to arbitrate the underlying dispute in this case - that is, whether UTA
18
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bargained in good faith to the point of impasse - directly contravenes the intent of
Congress and cannot be granted. On the contrary, this is manifestly an issue of state law
that must be decided by state courts.
C.

ACCEPTING THE UNION'S POSITION WOULD FRUSTRATE
THE INTENT OF CONGRESS IN ENACTING THE UMTA AND
INTERFERE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF UTAH LABOR LAW.

In seeking an order compelling arbitration, the Union ignores the Supreme Court's
direction in Jackson Transit and instead points to UTA's 13(c) Arrangement, which
includes a requirement that UTA provide for the continuation of collective bargaining, as
well as an arbitration clause. Indeed, the Union quotes language from the 13(c)
Arrangement that, taken out of context, appears to create an independent duty to
collectively bargain with the Union. See Union Brief at 24-25 (quoting 13(c)
Arrangement at <[} 3). The Union then cites to the 13(c) Arrangement's arbitration clause,
and argues that UTA must arbitrate the issue of whether it bargained in good faith, as if
If 3 of the 13(c) Arrangement somehow preempts the statutory requirement found in
Section 813. Id.
Accepting the Union's argument in these circumstances, however, would frustrate
the intent of the UMTA (as explained by the Supreme Court) and would interfere in the
orderly development of Utah labor law. Even assuming that % 3 of the 13(c)
Arrangement does constitute a direct promise on the part of UTA to engage in collective
bargaining, the mere presence of such a promise does not preempt the clearly
independent obligation found in Section 813. In short, if ^ 3 means what the Union says
it means, then UTA has an obligation under both the 13(c) Arrangement and under
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Section 813 to bargain collectively with the Union, and the question is which obligation
takes precedence when both arguably apply. That question is answered by the Supreme
Court's declaration that Section 13(c) requires that states, as a condition of receiving
federal transit assistance, must provide for the continuation of collective bargaining
rights, but that such rights are to be supplied by state law, and that those state laws are to
be interpreted and applied by the state courts. Jackson Transit, 457 U.S. at 27-28.
Allowing an arbitrator to decide these issues would effectively cede control of
state labor laws to the federal government, contrary to the Supreme Court's direction in
Jackson Transit. As a practical matter, the decision of an arbitrator can be appealed only
under very limited circumstances - mere disagreement with the language of the 13(c)
Arrangement is not enough. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-124 (LexisNexis 2008)
(setting forth the bases for vacating an arbitration award under the Utah Arbitration Act).
Therefore, the language of f 3 would effectively never come to the courts for a de novo
interpretation, and the courts would never be able to interpret it. Furthermore, Section
813 would not ever come before the courts for interpretation because, as the Union seems
to argue, such a claim would effectively be preempted by <([ 3 of the 13(c) Arrangement.
This "enforcement" of Section 813 would entirely exclude Utah's courts, contrary to the
intent of the UMTA.
D.

PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE 13(c) IS A "BELT AND SUSPENDERS9
PROVISION THAT APPLIES ONLY IF THERE WERE NO
APPLICABLE UTAH STATUTE.

Interpreted in the light of UMTA5 s intent, ^ 3 is clearly a "belt and suspenders"
provision that would come into play only if there were no applicable statute. For
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example, if the state legislature were to amend Section 813 to restrict or eliminate the
collective bargaining rights accorded to transit employees, ^f 3 would ensure that such
rights would be accorded to UTA's employees as a matter of agreement. And in that
situation, UTA would be required to arbitrate any claim that it had violated «f 3 by, for
example, failing to bargain in good faith, or implementing unilateral changes without first
negotiating to impasse. However, because transit employees in Utah are accorded these
rights by statute, then the rule of Jackson Transit applies, and the statute takes precedence
and must be enforced by Utah courts.
E.

SECTION 813'S REFERENCE TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
DOES NOT MEAN STATUTORY DISPUTES MUST BE
ARBITRATED.

There is no support for the Union's argument that the 13(c) Arrangement
"contemplates that disputes over violations of state law protecting collective bargaining
rights are subject to arbitration.'5 Union's Brief at 30. The Union asserts this argument
based on Section 813's reference to the Secretary of Labor and the Supreme Court's
holding that a union may lawfully agree to the arbitration of statutory claims. Id. at 3031. These purported reasons do not support the Union's argument.
Section 813 states that
The rights, benefits, and other employee protective conditions and remedies
of Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C.
Sec. 5333(b), as determined by the Secretary of Labor, apply to a public
transit district's establishment and operation of a public transit service or
system.
Utah Code Aim. § 17B-2a-813(l). This does not say, as the Union apparently contends,
that Utah has ceded its labor relations law to the Secretary of Labor. Rather, this
21
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subsection properly authorizes public transit districts to comply with the UMTA,
including compliance with protective arrangements that must be certified by the
Secretary of Labor as adequately protective of employees. 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b).
Furthermore, Subsection (1) is followed by Subsection (2), which affirmatively
sets forth the collective bargaining rights of transit employees, as provided by state law.
Subsection (2) does not indicate that these rights are to be enforced pursuant to
procedures in the 13(c) Arrangement; nor does it indicate that such collective bargaining
rights themselves are found in the 13(c) Arrangement. In addition, even assuming for the
sake of argument that UTA could agree to arbitrate statutory violations, there is no
reference to arbitration of such rights. Indeed, Subsection (2) of Section 813 is plainly
enacted in response to Utah's duty under Section 13(c) to provide for the continuation of
collective bargaining rights under state law. No other interpretation complies with the
intent of the UMTA as declared in Jackson Transit.
Finally, the Section 13(c) Arrangement itself contains no reference to Utah law,
and the Arrangement's arbitration provision does not include any duty to arbitration
statutory violations. For these reasons, the 13(c) Arrangement does not contemplate
arbitration of statutory claims.
F.

THE UNION'S ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF ARBITRATION
CONFLICT WITH THE INTENT OF CONGRESS AS DECLARED
BY THE SUPREME COURT.

The Union's arguments in favor of arbitration cannot be allowed to overcome the
clear intent of Congress that labor relations for public transit employees continue to be
governed by state law and enforced in state courts.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
22 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

1.

Public Policy Favors Arbitration Only Where the Parties have
Agreed, and UTA Did Not Agree to Arbitrate this Dispute.

The Union asks this Court to compel arbitration based on federal and state policies
encouraging arbitration. However, these policies require arbitration only where the
parties have agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute at issue. The Utah Uniform

I

Arbitration Act provides that, in response to a motion to compel arbitration, "[i]f the
court finds that there is no enforceable agreement, it may not... order the parties to
i
arbitrate. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-108(3). In Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 382
v. Utah Transit Authority, 2004 UT App 310, the Utah Court of Appeals held that the
Utah Arbitration Act precludes an order of arbitration in the absence of an enforceable

i

agreement to arbitrate. 2004 UT App 310 atffif15-16. This accords with federal labor
law, which does not require an employer to arbitrate disputes with a labor union unless
the employer has agreed to do so:
The first principle gleaned from the trilogy is that "arbitration is a matter of
contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute
which he has not agreed so to submit. This axiom recognizes the fact that
arbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes only because the parties
have agreed in advance to submit such grievances to arbitration.
AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648-49

^

(1986) (citations omitted). The mere presence of an arbitration agreement is insufficient,
because "a court may order arbitration of a particular dispute only where the court is
i
satisfied that the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute" Granite Rock Co. v. InVl
B'hood of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2856 (2010) (emphasis in original).
In this case, UTA has never agreed to arbitrate claimed violations of Section 813,
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i

whether in its collective bargaining agreement or in the 13(c) Arrangement. The Union
has not suggested that UTA's collective bargaining agreement requires arbitration of this
dispute, and the 13(c) Arrangement contains only a limited arbitration agreement.
Section 8(a) of the 13(c) Arrangement limits arbitration to disputes "regarding the
application, interpretation, or enforcement of this Arrangement." 13(c) Arrangement,
Record at 88, § (8)(a). It does not cover this dispute, which is based on Utah labor law
(specifically, Section 813), not the 13(c) Arrangement. Thus, the state and federal
policies in favor of arbitration do not apply in this case because the dispute at issue does
not involve an alleged violation of a collective bargaining agreement, and Jackson
Transit requires that Utah state law - Section 813 - provide the collective bargaining
rights claimed by the Union. Moreover, the parties did not agree to arbitrate alleged
violations of Utah law.
2.

Arbitrators do not have Special Expertise in Deciding Fundamental
Labor Law Issues and State Court Judges are Capable of Deciding
Such Issues.

The Union also argues that labor arbitrators have expertise in deciding claims that
a party in collective bargaining failed to bargain in good faith or failed to bargain to
impasse, and that state courts are not able to decide such issues. Union Brief at 30-31.
This contention is incorrect.
Labor arbitrators typically do not address charges of an alleged failure to bargain
in good faith. Arbitrators are typically called upon only to resolve disputes over the
application of the applicable collective bargaining agreement, not fundamental labor law
issues such as whether a party has bargained in good faith. See Elkouri & Elkouri, How
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i
Arbitration Works Ch. 10.3.A.v.a.(l) (6th ed. 2003) ("the arbitrator's decisional authority
is limited to contractual issues; the arbitrator does not have the inherent authority to
decide issues concerning compliance with the NLRA"). Thus, virtually all collective
bargaining agreements include dispute resolution procedures that consist of grievance and
arbitration, but these procedures typically only address alleged violations of the
agreement, not any and all disputes between the parties, or between an employee and the
company. An alleged failure to bargain in good faith would not violate the collective

4

bargaining agreement.
On the contrary, in the private sector a failure to bargain in good faith is a
I
violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, and is adjudicated by the
National Labor Relations Board. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1974) ("It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer ... (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the

'

representatives of his employees"); 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1984) (explaining procedure for
adjudicating unfair labor practices). The Board investigates charges alleging unfair labor
practices and, where appropriate, authorizes a complaint to be filed and a hearing before
an administrative law judge. Id. at § 160(b). The ALJ decision can then be appealed to
4
the Board itself, and the Board's decisions can be appealed to the federal courts of
appeals and from there to the Supreme Court. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f).2 Arbitrators have
nothing to do with this process.

4

Consequently, arbitrators have no special expertise in deciding these issues. They

2

In addition, since the Board's orders are not self-executing, the Board must also
petition a federal court of appeals for enforcement. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e).
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4

deal with private disputes concerning alleged violations of a particular collective
bargaining agreement between a union and a particular employer, while the NLRB and
federal courts decide alleged statutory violations that involve matters of public concern.
Similarly, Utah's labor relations laws should be decided by the courts, not private
arbitrators.3
Second, Utah's state court judges are capable of deciding labor law issues raised
by Section 813, including whether UTA has bargained in good faith to impasse. Like
other legal questions that come before the courts, deciding a labor law issue would
require finding facts and then applying law. Both UTA and the Union would call
witnesses to testify about facts such as (1) how many bargaining sessions were held and
the length of those sessions; (2) whether the parties had an opportunity to discuss all
issues concerning the terms and conditions of employment; (3) whether proposals were
made and responded to; (4) whether UTA informed the Union that it was making a
"final" offer; and (5) whether the Union rejected that offer.
The court could then determine whether the parties were in fact at impasse, and
whether UTA (and the Union) had bargained in good faith. In making this determination,
the court could draw on case law from the National Labor Relations Board and the
federal courts as persuasive, though not binding, precedent, as contemplated by Section
13(c). There is nothing particularly unusual or specialized about these concepts.
3

The Union may argue that Section 813 really only deals with UTA and the Union,
because it only applies by its terms to public transit workers. The Court should consider
the fact, however, that Section 813 deals with basic concepts of labor law that logically
would have relevance for all Utah public employees who are represented through
collective bargaining.
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Furthermore, these decisions would be public and subject to appeal, unlike the decisions
of private arbitrators, and most importantly, such decisions would declare the law of
i
collective bargaining in the state of Utah.
3.

Out-of-State Arbitrators Should not Decide Fundamental Issues of
Utah Labor Law.

I

Not only do arbitrators lack special expertise on the issue of bargaining in good
faith to impasse, as a practical matter, a private arbitrator will always be drawn from
i
outside Utah, and will be ill-equipped to apply Utah law. It is a well-known fact that
Utah has relatively few unionized employers, with the consequence that Utah has very
few, if any, labor arbitrators. As a result, the vast majority of labor arbitrations in Utah

i

are arbitrated by arbitrators from outside Utah. For example, the arbitration between
UTA and the Union concerning § 9(g) of the 13(c) Arrangement was arbitrated by Gary
Axon, from Oregon. In fact, the panel of labor arbitrators provided by the American
Arbitration Association pursuant to the 13(c) Arrangement did not even include any
arbitrators from Utah. Allowing an out-of-state arbitrator to effectively declare issues of
Utah law is contrary to the UMTA and the public policy of Utah.
An out-of-state arbitrator would be ill-equipped to declare Utah law that may vary

4

in some respects from the law in other states or as declared by the National Labor
Relations Board. Notwithstanding the Donovan court's decision that state labor laws do
4
not comply with Section 13(c) unless they incorporate the essence of "federal labor
policy," Donovan made clear that state labor laws need not precisely mirror federal labor
law:

^

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

27

Thus, Congress neither imposed upon the states the precise definition of
"collective bargaining" established by the NLRA and the case law that has
developed under that Act, nor did it employ a term of art devoid of all
meaning, leaving the states free to interpret and define it as they saw fit.
Instead, Congress used the phrase generically, incorporating within the
statute the commonly understood meaning of "collective bargaining." The
1964 Congress was not writing on a clean slate. Then as now, collective
bargaining was universally understood to require, at a minimum, good faith
negotiations, to a point of impasse, if necessary, over wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment.
Donovan, 767 F.2d at 949. Thus, Utah is free to establish its own collective bargaining
laws, subject to the requirement that they include, "at a minimum, good faith
negotiations, to a point of impasse, if necessary, over wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment.55 Utah cannot develop its own labor laws and policy if it must
be required to submit all decisions regarding those laws to arbitrators from outside the
state, who would then make decisions that are effectively unreviewable.
4.

UTA Contends that it Bargained in Good Faith to Impasse.

UTA agrees with much of the Union's general discussion of the duty to bargain in
good faith. The duty to bargain in good faith requires that both parties bargain with the
bona fide intention of reaching agreement. It does not require either party to agree to any
particular provision, but does require each party to consider and respond in good faith to
all requests of the other side that fall into the category of "mandatory55 subjects of
bargaining. See generally 1 John E. Higgins, Jr., The Developing Labor Law, Ch. 13.LB.
(5 A ed.2006).
UTA also agrees that if the employer bargains in good faith to impasse, and any
previous collective bargaining agreement has expired, then the employer is privileged to

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28

1
make unilateral changes to the terms and conditions of employment consistent with its
bargaining proposals. See Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1996)
(citing cases). The Union therefore overstates the case when it asserts that unilaterally
implementing new terms and conditions of employment is, without more, a per se breach
of the duty to bargain in good faith. Union Brief at 19 (citing NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S.
736, 742-43 (1962)). There is no such breach if the employer has first bargained in good
faith to impasse. Indeed, the employer in Katz made unilateral changes shortly after

i

bargaining began, and thus the Court held it committed an unfair labor practice by failing
to first bargain to impasse. 369 U.S. at 741-42 (although ten negotiating sessions were
I
held between October 1956 and May 1957, employer made unilateral changes in October
1956 and January 1957 "before, as we find on the record, the existence of any possible
impasse").

•

'

In this case, UTA met with the Union on numerous occasions from August until
December 2009, and negotiated in good faith on all issues raised by either the Union or
UTA. UTA declared an impasse in December 2009 only because it genuinely believed
that impasse had been reached, based on the multitude of discussions in all of these
i
previous bargaining sessions, UTA's tender of a "last, best and final offer" to the Union,
and the Union's rejection of that offer. Based on that determination, UTA implemented
changes consistent with its bargaining proposals on December 21, 2009.

4

The award issued by Arbitrator Axon found that UTA had improperly
implemented changed terms, but not based on any alleged bad faith bargaining. Rather,
the arbitrator determined that UTA violated the 13(c) Arrangement by failing to first
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4

complete the fact-finding process, which is a procedure completely separate from
bargaining. Neither side had ever invoked fact-finding, but the arbitrator held that a
"status quo55 provision in the 13(c) Arrangement's fact finding procedure prevented UTA
from making changes unless it first invoked and completed the fact-finding procedure.
The arbitrator did not address the issue of whether UTA bargained in good faith.
The Union "contends55 that UTA bargained in bad faith, Union's Brief at 23, but
this is nothing more than a contention - which UTA emphatically denies. On the
contrary, UTA believes that it bargained in good faith and that, but for the arbitrator's
ruling on the status quo provision of the 13(c) Arrangement, its implementation of
changes would have been entirely proper.
For all of the reasons stated above, the Court should deny the Union's request to
compel UTA to arbitrate the issue of whether it bargained in good faith to impasse. That
issue is a question of Utah state law, as stated in Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2a-813, and as
declared by the Supreme Court of the United States, and must be decided by Utah courts,
including this Court.
n.

THE COURT SHOULD RULE THAT THE SUBSTANTIVE DISPUTE IS
RENDERED MOOT BY THE ARBITRATOR'S DECISION AND DECIDE
ONLY THE PROCEDURAL QUESTION PRESENTED BY THIS APPEAL.
UTA asks that the Court rule that the substantive dispute in this case was rendered

moot by the decision of the arbitrator in the arbitration conducted pursuant to the 13(c)
Arrangement, and decide only the procedural issue and then dismiss the case as moot.
UTA presented its arguments in favor of this position in its Suggestion of
Mootness and Memorandum in Support of Suggestion of Mootness. The Union
30
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I
unsuccessfully attempted to rebut these arguments in its Memorandum in Opposition to
Appellee's Suggestion of Mootness ("Union Opposition"). The Union essentially argued
i
that the substantive issue in the case was not moot because a court or arbitrator could
(1) award a different and further remedy from the one already awarded by the arbitrator,
and (2) based on the "public interest" exception to the general rule against deciding moot
issues, provide guidance as to (a) what constitutes bad faith bargaining for future
bargaining between the parties, and (b) whether such claims should be decided by a court

-

or arbitrator. Union Opposition at 13-15, 18-21. These arguments should be rejected for
the reasons stated below.
A.

THERE IS NO ADDITIONAL REMEDY TO AWARD.

It would be improper for a court or arbitrator to award a further and different
remedy. The NLRB typically awards the following remedy for an employer's failure to

(

bargain in good faith:
The usual remedy for an employer's refusal to bargain in violation of
Section 8(a)(5) is an order (1) to cease and desist from refusing to bargain,
and (2) upon request, to bargain collectively regarding rates of pay, wages,
hours, and other conditions of employment.

^

2 The Developing Labor Law Ch. 32.IILB. 1 .d.(l). In addition, where the Board
I

determines that the employer wrongfully made unilateral changes without first bargaining
to impasse, the Board "usually will order that the status quo ante be restored and that
4

employees be made whole for any benefits that the employer has unilaterally
discontinued." Id. at Ch. 32.III.B.l.d.(5)(a). The Board does not award unspecified
"monetary damages," as the Union apparently contends. Union Opposition at 13.
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In the 13(c) arbitration, upon finding that UTA was required to complete factfinding before making any changes, the arbitrator ordered UTA to restore the status quo
ante and maintain it until the parties entered into a replacement agreement, completed
fact-finding, or reached a certain deadline. Arbitration Award (excerpts included with
Dunn Affidavit in Addendum A) at 35. Although the arbitrator - logically - did not
order the parties to engage in bargaining, they did so, and reached agreement. Dunn
Affidavit, Addendum A, atffif5-6.
Because of the Award and the new agreement, there is now nothing left to award.
The Union suggests that a court or arbitrator could order UTA to (1) cease and desist;
(2) post notices; and (3) pay damages, Union Opposition at 13, but there are no damages
to pay and going through an arbitration or court proceeding for the purpose of possibly
obtaining an order to cease and desist and post notices regarding alleged practices that are
even now nearly two years old is simply not worth the trouble for the parties, the
witnesses, or taxpayers. Even if the Union claims UTA has failed to restore the status
quo ante, that argument should be made in a proceeding seeking enforcement of an
arbitration award, not in an action on the merits seeking a new and different remedy.
Accordingly, the Union's argument regarding an additional remedy should be rejected.
B.

THE PUBLIC INTEREST EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS
DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO THE SUBSTANTIVE
DISPUTE.

The Union's argument based on the public interest exception is also without merit.
Pursuant to the public interest exception, this Court will rule on a technically moot issue
"when the case presents an issue that affects the public interest, is likely to recur, and
32
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1
because of the brief time that any one litigant is affected, is capable of evading, review."
Ellis v. Swenson, 2000 UT 101, ^f 26 (citations and internal quotes omitted). Even then,
the Court will rely on this exception only if it determines that it is appropriate. Id. The
underlying issue in this case meets the first step of this test because this issue does affect
the public interest, but fails the other two.
1.

UTA is Unlikely to Implement Unilateral Changes in the Future
Because of the Requirement to Engage in Fact-Finding.
4

First, although UTA and the Union will continue to collectively bargain in the
future, it is unlikely as a practical matter that this issue will ever arise again because of
the arbitrator's award that, irrespective of whether it bargained in good faith to impasse,

4

UTA must nevertheless complete the fact-finding process before implementing any
unilateral changes. Fact-finding is a procedure that closely resembles "interest
arbitration," except that the fact-finder publicly issues factual findings and
recommendations rather than a binding decision. Since 1989, when fact-finding was first
made a part of the 13(c) Arrangement, the fact-finding procedure was invoked only once
(by the Union) and never taken to completion. Given the fact that this procedure must be
completed before unilateral changes can even be contemplated, it is unlikely that the
issue of good faith bargaining will ever arise again.
2.

*

Even if the Issue Arises Again, it Would not Evade Review.
4

Second, in the unlikely event that the issues were to arise again, there is no reason
to believe it would evade review, because if UTA implements unilateral changes after
completing fact-finding, and the Union believes that UTA did not bargain in good faith, it

4
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could simply file suit or initiate an arbitration and have the issue decided at that time.
For these reasons, the public interest exception does not apply as to the substantive
dispute in this case.
C.

THE COURT SHOULD DECIDE THE PROCEDURAL ISSUE
ONLY, AND THEN DISMISS THE REMAINDER OF THE CASE AS
MOOT.

Although the substantive issue is moot and should not be considered, UTA does
not object to consideration of the procedural question presented for appeal, that is,
whether an allegation of an unfair labor practice (that could arguably violate Section 813
or TI3 of the 13(c) Arrangement) must be arbitrated or decided by a court. That issue
affects the public interest, is likely to recur in the future, and is "capable" of evading
review. In addition, that issue has now been fully briefed. Accordingly, there is no
further cost to the parties and issuing a decision would be an appropriate exercise of the
Court's discretion.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, UTA respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district
court ruling that the underlying dispute in this case - the allegation that UTA violated
Section 813 by failing to bargain in good faith with the Union - was subject to resolution by
Utah's courts of general jurisdiction and not by arbitration. In addition, UTA asks that the
Court rule that the underlying dispute is now moot and therefore that the case should be
remanded to the district court to be dismissed with prejudice.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34

DATED this [t

day of September, 2011.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.

Scott A. Hagen
D. Zachary Wiseman
David B. Dibble
Attorneys for Utah Transit Authority
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Joseph E. Hatch (#1415)
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite #200
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801)268-4042
Facsimile: (801)747-1049

HAY QUINNEY
MAY 2 3 2011
& NEBEKER

Arthur F. Sandack (#2854)
8 East Broadway, Suite 411
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 595-1300
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant Local 382

m THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a Utah
public transit district,

AFFIDAVIT OF
RODNEY DUNN

Plaintiff AND Appellee,
vs.
LOCAL 382 OF THE AMALGAMATED
TRANSIT UNION,

CaseNo.20100940-SC

Defendant and Appellant.
STATE OF UTAH

)
ISS

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

I, Rodney Dunn, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
1.

That I am an adult male, of sound mind, and resident of the State of Utah.

2.

That I have personal knowledge of the matters stated in this Affidavit.
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3.

That I am the duly elected President and Business Agent of Local 382 of the

Amalgamated Transit Union, the Appellant in this case.
4.

That on December 11, 2010, the neutral arbitrator, Gary Axon, in the companion

arbitration to this court action, rendered his decision and award. A true and correct copy of the
decision and award is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
5.

That, as a result of the arbitration award, Local 382 and the Utah Transit

Authority (UTA) resumed collective bargaining negotiations for a successor collective
bargaining agreement.
6.

That said negotiations resulted in the agreement to a successor collective

bargaining agreement effective April 1, 2011 through December 10, 2011.
7.

That, as part of the negotiations, Local 382 and the UTA entered into an

agreement which preserved any claim the parties may have with this appeal. A true and correct
copy of the agreement entitled "Release" is attached hereto as Exhibit "B".

DATED this \&

day of May 2011.

l<CjzdLjiuz+.f U
Rodney Dunn I

U/ASI.

'

Rodney Dunn, appeared before me this / ^ day of May 2011 and signed this document
in my presence and affirmed that he has read this document, understood its contents, and that the
contents were true of his own personal knowledge.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this j ^

L

day of KM(Li0

NOTARY PUBLIC
DIANE OSBORNE
Commission # 576984
My Commission Expires
December 15, 2012

i.Aa/u. f^knirr^j
NOTARY PUBLIC

STATE OF UTAH
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.2011.

MAILING CERTIFICATE

On this

of May, 2011,1 deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid,

a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Rodney Dunn to:
Scott A. Hagen
D. Zachary Wiseman
Liesel B. Stevens
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER, P.C.
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385
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I
IN THE MATTER OF ARBITRATION
BETWEEN

ARBITRATION BOARD'S

AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION,
LOCAL 382,

OPINION AND AWARD
PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENT

Union,
and
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY,
Employer.

HEARING SITE:

UTA Offices
Salt Lake City, Utah

HEARING DATES:

July27&28,2010

POST-HEARING BRIEFS DUE:

Opening Briefs postmarked August 21, 2010
Reply Briefs postmarked September 17, 2010

RECORD CLOSED ON RECEIPT
OF REPLY BRIEFS:
REPRESENTING THE UNION:

September 21, 2010
Joseph E. Hatch
5295 So. Commerce Drive, Suite 200
Murray, Utah 84107
Arthur F. Sandack
8 East Broadway, Suite 411
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

REPRESENTING THE EMPLOYER:

Scott A. Hagen
Ray Quinney & Nebeker P.C.
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah

PARTY APPOINTED ARBITRATORS:

Joseph E. Hatch, Union
Scott A. Hagen, Employer

NEUTRAL ARBITRATOR

Gary L Axon
P.O. Box 190
Ashland, OR 97520
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Prior to these days the parties' disagreements were not yet focused and were too fluid
to rise to the meaning of a "labor dispute" as described in paragraph 9(a).
The parties' CBA expired on December 21, 2009. The parties could not
have requested fact-finding until January 12, 2010, at the earliest. Since the parties
could not have requested fact-finding until after the CBA had expired, the status quo
provisions of paragraph 9(g) must apply regardless of whether the parties' negotiations
are at a stalemate.
The Union requests that all terms and conditions of the expired CBA be
reinstated until the parties either enter into a new agreement or until the conclusion of
the fact-finding process and that those terms and conditions are made retroactive to
December 21, 2009.

B. The Employer
ISSUE 1
UTA argues the status quo provision found in subparagraph 9(g) of the
Protective Arrangement "...is intended to protect the integrity of the fact-finding
proceedings by ensuring that no unilateral changes are made during the pendency of
those proceedings. It does not have any independent operation outside the fact-finding
process. If neither party invokes fact-finding, there is no duty to maintain the status
quo."

Er. Br., p. 4.

UTA insists it acted properly when it imposed contract terms

following the expiration of the parties' CBA. Had the Union wished to maintain status
quo, it merely needed to request fact-finding. Because the Union failed to do so, the
Employer had no obligation to maintain provisions in the expired contract.
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IN THE MATTER OF ARBITRATION
BETWEEN

ARBITRATION BOARD'S

AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION,
LOCAL 382,

AWARD
PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENT

Union,
and
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY,
Employer.

AWARD

Having reviewed all of the evidence and argument, the Arbitration Board
concludes and orders as follows:

1. UTA violated paragraphs 9(a) - 9(g) of the Protective
Arrangement when management imposed the terms and
conditions for a successor Agreement prior to the invocation
of the mandatory fact-finding process.
2. The date of November 13, 2009 is the date the labor
dispute between UTA and ATA first arose for purposes of
9(a) of the 13(c) Protective Arrangement.
3. The Arbitration Board orders that all terms and conditions
of the expired Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be
made retroactive to December 21, 2009. The terms and
conditions shall continue until the parties either enter into a
successor Collective Bargaining Agreement or until March 4,
2011, whichever comes first. If either party invokes factfinding on or before March 4, 2011, then the terms and
conditions of the expired Collective Bargaining Agreement
shall continue, unless otherwise agreed in writing by the
parties, until the conclusion of the fact-finding proceedings.
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4. The Arbitration Board will retain jurisdiction for a period of
60 days from the date of the Award to resolve any questions
arising out of the remedy so ordered.

Gai#7fc-Axon /
Neutral Board Member
Dated: December 11, 2010

0
E. (Qatr^h
tiatch

*

Joseph
ATU Appointed Board Member

^v

/ftxV\&M?\i!/W\

Scott A. Hagen
O
UTA Appointed Board Member

Concur>t)issent

Concur// Dissent

Dated: December/^ , 2010

Dated: December l b , 2010
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